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Abstract
This paper studies the choice between general and speci¯c human capital.
A trade-o® arises because general human capital, while less productive, can
easily be reallocated across ¯rms. Accordingly, the fraction of individuals with
speci¯c human capital depends on the amount of uncertainty in the economy.
Our model implies that while economies with more speci¯c human capital tend
to be more productive, they also tend to be more vulnerable to turbulence. As
such, our theory sheds some light on the experience of Japan, where human
capital is notoriously speci¯c: while Japan bene¯ted from this predominately
speci¯c labor force in tranquil times, this speci¯city may also have been at the
heart of its prolonged stagnation.
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This paper provides a simple theory of the choice between general and speci¯c human
capital. Our theory is based on a trade-o® between productivity and the ability to
reallocate human capital ex post: speci¯c human capital is more productive than
general human capital, but, unlike general human capital, it cannot be reallocated
across ¯rms. Hence, the determining factor for the choice of human capital is the
extent of uncertainty about future productivity that ¯rms and workers face when
making investment decisions: economies with lower such uncertainty tend to have
more workers with speci¯c human capital, and thus tend to be more productive.
However, economies with more speci¯c human capital tend to be more vulnerable to
shocks due to the inherent di±culty in reallocating such capital.
Our theory provides a coherent, though stylized, view of the Japanese economic
experience since the 1950's, which can be loosely characterized as a long period of
success followed by a prolonged stagnation. Our model attributes the ¯rst phase to
the predominance of speci¯c human capital in Japan, a fact well documented by ?.
We then appeal to the recent increase in economic volatility, a phenomenon which
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) refer to as turbulence, as the trigger and to the com-
position of the Japanese labor force as the driving force behind the recent Japanese
economic experience.1 A lack of reallocation of labor of the kind that our model gen-
erates following a turbulence shock has long been suggested as an important source of
Japan's stagnation (e.g. see Higuchi and Hashimoto (2004) and Kawamoto (2004)).
Unlike most proposed explanations, our theory generates a prolong stagnation with-
out relying on any ine±ciencies.2
The environment we consider is an overlapping generations model where workers
accumulate human capital when young, work when middle-aged, and retire when
old. Cohorts of ¯rms (or projects) are clearly identi¯ed with generations of workers.
Upon paying a ¯xed cost of entry, ¯rms receive a signal (good or bad) about their
future productivity and hire young workers accordingly: ¯rms who expect to be more
1See Comin and Philippon (2005) for empirical evidence on turbulence and increased volatility
at the ¯rm level observed in the last 20 years or so across many countries.
2See Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) and Porter and Sakakibara (2004) for a review. Coleman (2005)'s
theory, which revolves around the emergence of China as a major competitor for Japan, is an
exception.
2productive hire more speci¯c human capital. Firms are only productive during the
second period of their existence, as are their workers. At the beginning of that second
period, ¯rms realize their level of productivity (high or low) and may alter the amount
of generalists used in production if desired.
Firms and workers in our environment sign long-term employment contracts. This
market arrangement is essential since ¯rms with good signals who realize a low produc-
tivity level end up with more specialists than they would like. Consequently, ¯rms
with unexpectedly low productivity would like to dispose of some of their workers
who have acquired speci¯c human capital. Clearly, these long-term contracts would
be meaningless without commitment, not only from ¯rms, but also from ¯nancial in-
termediaries (insurers) who end up bailing out ¯rms (and workers) with unexpectedly
low realized productivity.
In this model, ex ante idiosyncratic uncertainty determines the allocation of hu-
man capital investment. Three types of equilibria may emerge in the model, depend-
ing on the expected productivity level of ¯rms with good or bad signals, as well as
the relative productivity of speci¯c versus general human capital. The entire equilib-
rium path for all cases is fully characterized. A key result is that output is higher in
economies where signals are more informative. Intuitively, this is true because human
capital is better allocated ex post in economies with more precise signals. We also
show that under certain conditions, ¯rm-speci¯c human capital is more predominant
in economies where signals are more precise.
We use the model to study the impact of turbulence. We model turbulence as a
state of the world in which signals carry no information, so that ¯rms with good and
bad signals are equally likely to receive a high productivity level. As the precision of
signals changes, however, we keep the fraction of ¯rms with high productivity con-
stant, so that in a well de¯ned sense the aggregate technology set remains unchanged.
Accordingly, turbulence has no impact in economies where all individuals acquire gen-
eral human capital. We show that a regime switch from tranquil to turbulent times
sends the economy on a smooth path towards a steady state with lower output. The
size of the total fall in output during the transition depends on the precision of sig-
nals in tranquil times: since output is increasing in the precision of signals, the fall
in output is increasing in the precision of signal in tranquil times.
3We also study the e®ects of unexpected transient turbulence. We show that the
fall in output during the period of the shock is increasing in the expected precision
of signals, regardless of whether the economy is in or out of steady state. While
the immediate impact of a transient shock is due to the misallocation of labor, its
persistence is due to the lower number of entering ¯rms, which produces less output,
and so on.3 Under certain conditions, we show that economies with more speci¯c
human capital are more productive but also more vulnerable to turbulence. As such,
our model is consistent with the broad observation that Japan's economy prospered
prior to the 1980's, but su®ered tremendously from the ensuing increase in economic
volatility.
Notice that a transient turbulence shock in our economy produces a prolonged
recession without any changes in productivity, as the aggregate technology set remains
unchanged by construction. Interestingly, however, the low level of output would
conventionally show up as low measured productivity, which Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) argue was the main cause of Japan's stagnation. However, Kawamoto (2004)
¯nds little evidence of a signi¯cant decline in the pace of technological progress in
the 1990's once he controls for various factors, including a reallocation e®ect. Indeed,
Kawamoto argues that the gap between measured productivity and `true' technology
is considerably higher in the 1990's than in the previous decades.
This paper is related to recent work by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004), who
argue that the interaction of shocks and institutions can reconcile the European and
U.S. unemployment divergence in the last two decades together with the fact that
European labor market institutions have been in place since World War II. The central
feature of their work is that the human capital of displaced workers is more likely to
deteriorate in turbulent times.4;5 Although the speci¯city of human capital is key to
3Interestingly, such turbulence shocks generate an increase in transfers from ¯nancial intermedi-
aries to unproductive ¯rms, reminiscent of what Caballero et al. (2005) called \zombie" lending.
4Using a job matching model with endogenous job destruction, den Haan et al. (2005) argue
that if turbulence also a®ects the skills of workers experiencing endogenous separation, then higher
turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment, thereby reversing the results of Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998, 2004).
5Our concept of turbulence is closely related to that of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998): while
workers in matches that turn out to be unproductive lose their human capital in their framework,
the production value of the human capital of workers in ¯rms with ex post low productivity is low
in our economy.
4their analysis, it is taken as exogenous in their framework. By contrast, we focus on
the decision to accumulate general versus speci¯c human capital and their allocation
across ¯rms in a model without unemployment. Our results imply that the impact
of turbulence critically depends on the amount of uncertainty and the predominance
of speci¯c human capital in the economy prior to the shock.
In a context similar to that of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), Wasmer (2004)
shows that an economy with more general human capital (U.S.) is able to adapt
better to an increase in turbulence than an economy with more speci¯c human cap-
ital (Europe). While some of our results are similar, we derive our results without
appealing to frictions in the labor market, nor do we rely on exogenous government
policies. Krueger and Kumar (2004) focus on the U.S.{Europe growth di®erence
since the 1980's. They build a model of education and technology adoption to argue
that the European focus on specialized, vocational education might have worked well
during the 1960's and 1970's, but not as well during the subsequent information age
when new technologies emerged at a more rapid pace. While the underlying eco-
nomic mechanism in that paper is quite di®erent from ours, the increased frequency
of switching technologies they consider could be interpreted as one of the sources of
the increase in uncertainty in our model.
The issues addressed in this paper are quite di®erent from those in the tradi-
tional literature on investment under uncertainty (see for example Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)). This literature focuses on the need/desire for insurance against idiosyncratic
risk faced by investors. By contrast, we consider an environment where investors are
able to completely pool idiosyncratic risk, and focus instead on the output (pro¯t)
maximizing allocation of the investment. The trade-o® we capture is between higher
productivity and °exibility, which arises as ¯rms and workers choose between speci¯c
and general human capital, as in the standard theory of human capital developed by
Becker (1964).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the eco-
nomic environment. A de¯nition of competitive equilibrium is o®ered in Section 3,
where we also prove the ¯rst welfare theorem and present some basic results regard-
ing e±cient and competitive equilibrium allocations in this economy. Depending on
parameter values, three types of equilibria with di®erent ex post allocation of general
5human capital may emerge. Accordingly, in Section 4 we partition the parameter
space into three regions and present a general way to ¯nd the equilibrium. We also
show that any economy converges at the same pace to its unique steady state, and
establish important comparative static results. The impact of turbulence is discussed
in Section 5, where we introduce a form of aggregate uncertainty in the model. Con-
cluding remarks are o®ered in Section 6.
2 The Environment
We consider a closed economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals
who live for 3 periods. Individuals invest in human capital when young, work when
middle-aged, and retire when old. Human capital investment can be of two distinct
types: general and ¯rm-speci¯c. While investment in speci¯c human capital is more
productive than investment in general human capital, speci¯c human capital can only
be used by the ¯rm for which it was acquired. By contrast, general human capital is
equally productive in all ¯rms. Each period, a single perishable consumption good
is produced by a continuum of ¯rms using human capital as the only input. For
convenience, we assume that cohorts of ¯rms correspond with cohorts of workers.
Upon paying a ¯xed cost of entry, ¯rms draw a signal about their second-period
productivity level. Using that information, they choose how many young workers
to hire and what type of human capital to employ. At the beginning of the second
period, the productivity of the ¯rm is realized, the ¯rm adjusts its labor force if
desired, and production takes place.
2.1 Individuals
There is a continuum (of measure one) of individuals born every period indexed by
i 2 [0;1]. They live and consume for three periods. During their ¯rst period of life,
individuals accumulate human capital which becomes productive when middle-aged
and depreciates fully when old. All individuals have the same preferences represented
by the utility function
U(c
1;c
2;c
3) ¡ v(h + g) = lnc
1 + ¯ lnc
2 + ¯
2 lnc
3 ¡ ´(h + g); (1)
6where h and g respectively represent speci¯c and general human capital acquired
when young, cj represents consumption at age j, 0 < ¯ < 1 is a discount factor and ´
is the utility cost of accumulating 1 unit of human capital. Although individuals can
acquire both general and speci¯c human capital when young, they can only supply
labor to a single ¯rm when middle-aged.
There are two generations of individuals already alive at the beginning of period 0:
there is a measure 1 of old individuals, who are entitled to c3
0 units of consumption,
and a measure 1 of middle-aged individuals with some arbitrary stocks of speci¯c and
general human capital, who are entitled to W 2
0 = Y0¡c3
0, where Y0 is the total output
in the economy. As far as the future evolution of the economy is concerned, the
initial condition is fully summarized by the disposable income of the initial middle-
aged individuals W 2
0.
2.2 Firms
Each period a measure of ex-ante identical potential entrants (¯rms or projects) are
born. Should they choose to enter, they must pay a ¯xed cost Á. Life cycle of ¯rms
coincides with the life cycle of individuals born in the same period. Newly entering
(young) ¯rms draw idiosyncratic signals s 2 fg;bg about their future productivity
and hire young workers. In the second period of their life, the ¯rms realize their
productivity level Z, hire additional general human capital if needed, and produce.
In the following period, the ¯rms become inactive (die). We denote ¹t the measure
of ¯rms entering in period t ¡ 1, as these ¯rms will produce in period t. In equilib-
rium, the measure of ¯rms entering in any given period is determined by a free-entry
condition.
We denote ½ the fraction of young ¯rms who draw the good signal g. After
drawing their individual signal, each young ¯rm decides how many young workers to
hire, and signs binding contracts with these workers. Each contract speci¯es the type
and amount of human capital to be acquired by the worker as well as payments to
the worker in the current and future periods. The labor market of young workers is
competitive.
The actual productivity levels, drawn at the beginning of the second period (t),
7can take on two values: Z 2 fZH;ZLg, where ZH > ZL > 0. The probability that
a ¯rm with signal s draws high productivity is denoted ¼s, with ¼g > ¼b > 0. Ex
post, the fraction of ¯rms with high productivity is ¼ = ½¼g +(1 ¡½)¼b. Once a ¯rm
realizes its productivity level Z, it can hire additional workers with general human
capital from other ¯rms or \lend out" its own workers. The market for middle-aged
workers with general human capital is also competitive. The production function of
an individual ¯rm is:
F(H;G) = Z
¡
H + °G
¢µ; (2)
where H and G respectively denote total stocks of speci¯c and general human capital
employed by the ¯rm, ° 2 (0;1) is the relative productivity of general human capital,
and µ 2 (0;1). This speci¯cation with ° < 1 implies that ¯rm-speci¯c human capital
is more productive than general human capital. The advantage of general human
capital is that it o®ers ¯rms °exibility, as workers with general human capital can be
reallocated from unexpectedly unproductive ¯rms to unexpectedly productive ones.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
There are several allocation-equivalent ways to model the ¯nancial (and insurance)
side of our economy. A transparent one is to think of a competitive mutual fund
¯nanced or created every period by middle-aged workers. This mutual fund pools
future idiosyncratic risk and advances credit to newly created ¯rms.
Entering ¯rms borrow from the intermediary to pay the entry cost. Upon realizing
their signal of future productivity, entering ¯rms borrow additional funds to pay
young workers they hire. E®ectively, this borrowing cannot be disentangled from the
insurance against future idiosyncratic productivity shocks that these young ¯rms are
purchasing. The \repayment" of these loans is contingent on the realized productivity
level next period. In fact, if the dispersion of productivity levels is su±ciently large,
¯rms could even receive further funds from the intermediary next period if their
productivity level were very low relative to expectations derived from the signal. But
these are ¯nanced from extraordinarily high \repayments" from the \lucky" ¯rms
and do not involve intergenerational transfers.
The ownership of ¯rms is irrelevant since competitive entry and full insurance
8against idiosyncratic risk guarantee that their value is zero. One could thus imagine
that the mutual fund e®ectively owns all the ¯rms it ¯nances and receives all their
revenues less wages paid. This \ownership" features unlimited liability.
3 Competitive Equilibria
A natural way to decentralize e±cient allocations in our environment is for new
¯rms to write long-term contracts with their workers specifying payments for the
three periods during which individuals live. Each contract is the solution to a ¯rm's
pro¯t maximization problem subject to keeping young workers' utility above some
reservation value. As will become clear in the next section, the model is much more
tractable under an equivalent representation. This representation uses the fact that
¯rms know precisely the way in which workers want to distribute their resources
over their life-time. It follows that ¯rms could equivalently o®er workers a single
wage payment in either period of a worker's life and let the worker decide on its
distribution across periods. In the de¯nition of a competitive equilibrium below, we
therefore assume without loss of generality that ¯rms only o®er a second period wage
to young workers they hire. We denote wH
t the wage of a worker born in period t¡1
who accumulates speci¯c human capital and wG
t that of a worker who accumulates
general human capital.
In the environment described above, ¯rms and workers sign long-term contracts.
This market arrangement is important to support speci¯c human capital in equilib-
rium. These long-term contracts, however, would be meaningless without commit-
ment. In particular, a severe hold-up problem emerges when ¯rms cannot commit to
these contracts, which result in an equilibrium without any speci¯c human capital.
In addition, commitment from ¯nancial intermediaries (insurers) is also essential, as
they end up bailing out ¯rms (and workers) with low realized productivity.6
6See Gervais and Livshits (2007) for a detailed analysis of a similar environment with various
degrees of commitment.
93.1 De¯nition
To simplify the exposition, the de¯nition of the competitive equilibrium that follows
uses the result of Proposition 1 which states that all individuals fully specialize either
in speci¯c or general human capital. This implies that the aggregate supply of speci¯c
and general human capital respectively are
Ht =
Z
ht(i)di;
Gt =
Z
gt(i)di:
A Competitive Equilibrium in this environment consists of sequences of prices
©
wH
t ;wG
t ;rt
ª
, allocation functions for individuals
©
c1
t¡1(i);c2
t(i);c3
t+1(i);ht(i);gt(i)
ª
and for ¯rms
©
Ht(s); ¦t(s);Gt(Z;H);Rt(Z;H)
ª
, and aggregates
©
¹t;Yt;Gt;Ht
ª
, such
that
1. given prices, individuals' allocations maximize utility subject to their (maxi-
mized) present-value budget constraint:7
max
c;h;g
h
lnc
1
t¡1 + ¯ lnc
2
t + ¯
2 lnc
3
t+1 ¡ ´(ht + gt)
i
s.t. c
1
t¡1(1 + rt) + c
2
t +
c3
t+1
1 + rt+1
6 max
©
w
H
t ht;w
G
t gt
ª (HHP)
2. given prices and stock of speci¯c human capital, Gt(Z;H) maximizes pro¯ts in
the second period:
Rt(Z;H) ´ max
G>0
h
Z
¡
H + °G
¢µ ¡ w
G
t G
i
(FP2)
3. given prices, signal and Rt(Z;H), Ht(s) maximizes expected present value of
pro¯ts:
¦t(s) ´ max
H
h
E[Rt(Z;H)js] ¡ w
H
t H
i
(FP1)
4. expected pro¯ts of entrants are zero:
E[¦t(s)]
1 + rt
= Á (3)
7The right-hand side of the budget constraint incorporates the result that individuals accumulate
either only speci¯c or only general human capital
105. markets clear:
Gt = ¹t
n
½
h
¼gGt
¡
ZH;Ht(g)
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¼g)Gt
¡
ZL;Ht(g)
¢i
+
(1 ¡ ½)
h
¼bGt
¡
ZH;Ht(b)
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¼b)Gt
¡
ZL;Ht(b)
¢io
(4)
Ht = ¹t
h
½Ht(g) + (1 ¡ ½)Ht(b)
i
(5)
c3
t+1
1 + rt+1
= ¹t+1Á + c
1
t (6)
c
1
t + c
2
t + c
3
t + Á¹t+1 = Yt (7)
where aggregate output in period t is given by
Yt = ¹t
h
½
³
¼gZH
¡
Ht(g)+°Gt(ZH;Ht(g))
¢µ+(1¡¼g)ZL
¡
Ht(g)+°Gt(ZL;Ht(g))
¢µ´
+(1¡½)
³
¼bZH
¡
Ht(b)+°Gt(ZH;Ht(b))
¢µ+(1¡¼b)ZL
¡
Ht(b)+°Gt(ZL;Ht(b))
¢µ´i
:
(8)
A few notes are in order. First, since generalists can be freely re-allocated when
middle-aged, their distribution across ¯rms when young is irrelevant. Second, whereas
the two labor market clearing conditions (equations (4) and (5)) and the goods market
clearing condition (equation (7)) are self-explanatory, the savings market clearing
condition (6) requires some explanation. This condition states that consumption of
the old must have been saved in the previous period as this is the only source of
income for old individuals. In turn, savings are used either to ¯nance entering ¯rms
or to provide young individuals with consumption.
3.2 Some Basic Results
Before proceeding to the analysis and implications of the model, we establish some
basic results that prove useful in the analysis.
First, because of the linearity of the utility function in human capital, all indi-
viduals will accumulate the same amount of human capital, given by (1+ ¯ +¯2)=´.
We thus normalize ´ = (1 + ¯ + ¯2), so that individuals will accumulate one unit of
11human capital.8 Second, we state without a formal proof that whenever both gen-
eral and ¯rm-speci¯c human capital is accumulated in equilibrium, young workers
have to be indi®erent between the two types of human capital. It follows that they
will receive the same wage regardless of the type of labor services they supply, i.e.
wH
t = wG
t = wt.
Our next two results can be stated either in terms of competitive equilibrium or
e±cient allocations. The ¯rst result establishes that all individuals fully specialize
either in speci¯c or general human capital.9 The second result establishes that our
economy always features a positive measure of individuals with ¯rm-speci¯c human
capital. We then show that the ¯rst welfare theorem holds in our environment.
Proposition 1 Neither e±cient nor competitive equilibrium allocations can feature
a positive measure of individuals acquiring both speci¯c and general human capital.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that in an e±cient (or competitive equilibrium)
allocation a ¯rm i hires a positive measure ¸ of individuals who make fraction · of
their human capital investment general and fraction (1 ¡ ·) speci¯c. Consider an
alternative allocation where ¯rm i hires ·¸ individuals acquire only general human
capital and the remaining (1¡·)¸ only acquire speci¯c human capital. The alternative
allocation results in weakly greater output for all productivity levels, while keeping
the cost of acquiring human capital constant. The output of the two allocations is the
same if there is no ex post reallocation, and the output of the alternative allocation
is greater if some of the workers under consideration are reallocated to other ¯rms.
When workers with general human capital are reallocated (·¸ of them), there is now
(1 ¡ ·)¸ workers with speci¯c human capital who remain productively employed in
¯rm i. That portion of the human capital stock was lost during reallocation in the
original allocation. Note further that the event in which the reallocation occurs has
strictly positive probability, since otherwise ¯rm i would make all its employees obtain
speci¯c human capital only. It follows that the alternative allocation always delivers
at least as much output as the original, and delivers strictly more output (revenue)
8This essentially amounts to normalizing the unit of time. More precisely, if we start with an
equilibrium under parameters (´;ZL;ZH), then the same equilibrium obtains under parameters
(~ ´; ~ ZL; ~ ZH), where ~ ´ = ¸´, ~ ZL = ¸µZL, and ~ ZH = ¸µZH.
9Recall that we used this result to simplify the statement of the labor market clearing conditions
in the de¯nition of competitive equilibrium.
12with strictly positive probability, while keeping the costs constant.10 This implies
that the original allocation could not have been e±cient nor pro¯t-maximizing since
the rental price of general human capital is strictly positive.
Proposition 2 The measure of individuals with speci¯c human capital is strictly
positive in any e±cient or competitive equilibrium allocation.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that once all ¯rms have received their
idiosyncratic productivity shock, even the ¯rm with the smallest productivity shock
will be operating and so would hire a positive amount of speci¯c human capital. In
other words, even if a ¯rm knew for sure that its productivity level tomorrow will
be low, it would still want to hire workers with speci¯c human capital since they are
more productive and no more expensive than generalists.11
Our next Proposition shows that the First Welfare theorem holds in this economy.
The following Lemma, which shows that unbounded growth cannot by sustained in
our economy, will be useful to prove the ¯rst welfare theorem.
Lemma 1 Feasible allocations in which consumption of successive generations grows
without bound feature utility of successive generations that declines without bound.
Proof. We start by establishing an upper bound on output that can be produced
given a measure of ¯rms ¹ and an aggregate stock of human capital H:
Y < ¹ZH
µ
H
¹
¶µ
:
Next, note that if the entire output of the economy is invested in period t ¡ 1, i.e.
¹t =
Yt¡1
Á , then the maximum achievable output in period t is given by
Yt = Y
1¡µ
t¡1
µ
ZH
Á1¡µ
¶
H
µ
t:
If the aggregate stock of human capital is ¯xed at H, the previous equation provides
a bound for output in the long run. To see this, de¯ne Y as long run output from
10Note that if ZL = 0, both allocations produce the same output as there is no gain in keeping
individuals with speci¯c human capital in unproductive ¯rms.
11Note that this proposition need not hold if ZL = 0.
13the previous equation:
Y =
µ
ZH
Á1¡µ
¶1=µ
H:
Note that if Yt¡1 > Y , then Yt < Yt¡1. It follows that for any ¯xed stock of human
capital H, Yt < max
©
Y0;Y
ª
for all t > 0. If output is to exceed some constant B in
the long run, then, the stock of human capital must exceed
H(B) =
µ
Á1¡µ
ZH
¶1=µ
B:
We now construct a very loose upper bound on the utility of a generation by
assuming that individuals consume the entire amount B in every period of their life,
but only produce it once.12 This delivers the upper bound
U(B) = (1 + ¯ + ¯
2)lnB ¡ ´
µ
Á1¡µ
ZH
¶1=µ
B:
This upper bound on utility U(B) goes to ¡1 as B increases. It follows that if
consumption is unbounded (B above goes to 1), the utility of a generation cannot
be bounded below.
Proposition 3 Competitive equilibrium allocations are e±cient.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a feasible allocation b c 3
0 ,
¡
b c 2
0 ;b c 3
1 ;h0;g0
¢
,
©
b c 1
t¡1;b c 2
t ;b c 3
t+1;b ht;b gt
ª1
t=1 for households, b G0(Z;H);H0(s),
© b Ht(s); b Gt(Z;H)
ª1
t=1 for ¯rms, and aggregates (¹0; b Y0;H0;G0),
©
b ¹t; b Yt; b Ht; b Gt
ª1
t=1,
which Pareto dominates the competitive equilibrium allocation. Note that if there
exists such an allocation which makes a positive measure of individuals in some
generation better o®, then there also exists an allocation that makes everyone in
that generation better o®. Accordingly, for the purposes of this proof we will only
consider such \equal treatment" allocations. We then simply have lnb c 3
0 > lnc 3
0 ,
lnb c 2
0 + ¯ lnb c 3
1 > lnc 2
0 + ¯ lnc 3
1 , and ut(b c;b ht + b gt) > ut(c;ht + gt) for all t > 1,
with strict inequality for at least one generation. Since preferences satisfy local non-
satiation, it follows from the de¯nition of competitive equilibrium that b c 3
0 > c 3
0 ,
b c 2
0 +
b c 3
1
1+rt+1 > W 2
0, and b c 1
t¡1(1 + rt) + b c 2
t +
b c 3
t+1
1+rt+1 > wH
t b ht + wG
t b gt for all t > 1, with
12We are in fact allowing the entire output to be both consumed and saved.
14strict inequality for at least one generation. Multiplying the latter inequalities by
Qt
¿=1
1
1+r¿ and summing over all generations, we get
1 X
t=0
Ã
t Y
¿=1
1
1 + r¿
!
¡
b c
1
t + b c
2
t + b c
3
t
¢
> c
3
0 + W
2
0 +
1 X
t=1
Ã
t Y
¿=1
1
1 + r¿
!
³
w
H
t b Ht + w
G
t b Gt
´
(9)
as long as the summations are ¯nite. To see that they are, ¯rst note that Lemma 1
implies that the economy cannot sustain unbounded growth, so that (b c 1
t + b c 2
t + b c 3
t )
is bounded. Furthermore, as will be shown in the next Section (see Proposition 4),
the competitive equilibrium converges to a steady state. To establish that the sum-
mation on the left-hand-side is ¯nite, then, we simply need to show that the interest
rate is strictly positive in that steady state. To see this, note that consumers with
logarithmic utility functions allocate income across periods in ¯xed proportions. If we
let Wss denote the steady state lifetime wealth of individuals in terms of young-age
consumption goods, then
c3
ss
(1 + rss)2 =
¯2
1 + ¯ + ¯2Wss;
c
1
ss =
1
1 + ¯ + ¯2Wss:
These expressions imply that market clearing condition (6) cannot hold in steady
state unless the interest rate is strictly positive in that steady state.
We now want to argue that, for all t > 1,
b Yt ¡ (w
H
t b Ht + w
G
t b Gt) ¡ b ¹tÁ(1 + rt) 6 Yt ¡ (w
H
t H + w
G
t G) ¡ ¹tÁ(1 + rt) = 0: (10)
To see that, consider the period-t production-planner's problem:
Jt ´ max
¹;H(¢);G(¢)
[TotalOutputt ¡ TotalWagest ¡ Á¹(1 + rt)]:
The only di®erence between this problem and a standard pro¯t maximization problem
15is that the number of ¯rms ¹ is now a choice variable. Formally,
Jt ´ max
¹;H(¢);G(¢)
n
¹½
h
¼gZH
¡
H(g) + °G(ZH;H(g))
¢µ + (1 ¡ ¼g)ZL
¡
H(g) + °G(ZL;H(g))
¢µi
+ ¹(1 ¡ ½)
h
¼gZH
¡
H(b) + °G(ZH;H(b))
¢µ + (1 ¡ ¼g)ZL
¡
H(b) + °G(ZL;H(b))
¢µi
¡ ¹w
G
t
h
½
¡
¼gG(ZH;H(g)) + (1 ¡ ¼g)G(ZL;H(g))
¢
+ (1 ¡ ½)
¡
¼bG(ZH;H(b)) + (1 ¡ ¼b)G(ZL;H(b))
¢i
¡ ¹w
H
t
h
½H(g) + (1 ¡ ½)H(b)
i
¡ Á¹(1 + rt)
o
(11)
The ¯rst key observation here is that the choice of ¹ does not in any way a®ect the
choice of human capital investment and allocation|¹ simply multiplies the objective.
The second key observation is that the competitive equilibrium allocation maximizes
the objective with respect to H(¢) and G(¢), taking ¹ as given. Incorporating these
observations, we get
Jt = max
¹
¹
·
max
H(¢);G(¢)
¡
E[¦t(s)] ¡ Á(1 + rt)
¢
¸
;
where E[¦t(s)] is the expected pro¯ts of an entering ¯rm in period t¡1. The last key
observation is that the maximum value of the expression in square brackets, which is
achieved by the competitive equilibrium allocation, is 0. This follows from the free
entry condition (3) on ¯rms in competitive equilibrium. It follows that no allocation
can achieve higher value for problem (11) than the competitive equilibrium allocation,
thereby establishing the desired result stated in equation (10).
Rearranging equation (10), we get wH
t b Ht +wG
t b Gt > b Yt ¡ b ¹tÁ(1+rt) for all t > 1.
Substituting this into the right-hand side of (9), and recalling that b Y0 6 Y0 = c 3
0 +W 2
0,
we obtain
1 X
t=0
Ã
t Y
¿=1
1
1 + r¿
!
¡
b c
1
t + b c
2
t + b c
3
t
¢
> b Y0 +
1 X
t=1
Ã
t Y
¿=1
1
1 + r¿
!
³
b Yt ¡ b ¹tÁ(1 + rt)
´
:
Rearranging then delivers
1 X
t=0
Ã
t Y
¿=1
1
1 + r¿
!
¡
b c
1
t + b c
2
t + b c
3
t + b ¹t+1Á
¢
>
1 X
t=0
Ã
t Y
¿=1
1
1 + r¿
!
b Yt:
16But that contradicts the feasibility of the candidate allocation, which requires that
for all t,
b c
1
t + b c
2
t + b c
3
t + Áb ¹t+1 6 b Yt:
4 Characterizing Equilibria
In this section we study the di®erent types of equilibria that this economy can gen-
erate. Three types of equilibria may emerge, depending on parameter values. In the
¯rst two cases, a fraction of individuals acquire speci¯c human capital and the rest
acquire general human capital. What di®erentiates these two cases is whether all ex
post productive ¯rms hire generalists or only those who received a bad signal ex ante
hire generalists.13 A special case of an equilibrium in which all high productivity
¯rms hire generalists is one where all individuals acquire general human capital. The
last type of equilibrium is one where all individuals acquire speci¯c human capital.
4.1 Solving for an Equilibrium
In Appendix A we show in detail how to construct the full solution to the model
for each type of equilibrium. As it turns out, the general way to ¯nd a solution is
common to all three types. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
At the beginning of any period t, the state of the economy is given by the number
of ¯rms that entered in the previous period as well as the amount of consumption
that is currently promised to the old, (¹t;c3
t). We now brie°y demonstrate how to
obtain
¡
¹t+1;c3
t+1
¢
from the current state.
We show in Appendix A that independent of the type of equilibrium, the la-
bor market clearing conditions implies that the wage rate in period t is completely
determined by the current measure of producing ¯rms:
wt = Aµ¹
1¡µ
t ; (12)
13Note that low productivity ¯rms never hire generalists.
17where A is a constant, the value of which depends on the type of equilibrium. Since
the labor share of output is given by µ, i.e. wt = µYt, we can write aggregate output
as a function of ¹:
Yt = A¹
1¡µ
t : (13)
The aggregate disposable income of middle-aged individuals is given by Y d
t ´ Yt¡
c3
t. With logarithmic utility functions, middle-aged individuals will save a constant
fraction of their income, Xt =
³
¯
1+¯
´
Y d
t , and consume the remainder, c2
t =
³
1
1+¯
´
Y d
t .
The market clearing condition for savings and investment then implies that
Xt =
µ
¯
1 + ¯
¶
(Yt ¡ c
3
t) = ¹t+1Á +
wt+1
(1 + rt+1)(1 + ¯ + ¯2)
: (14)
In other words, the resources saved by the current middle-aged are used to pay the
entry cost of ¯rms that will produce tomorrow as well as the consumption of young
individuals in period t, which they optimally choose to be a fraction of the wage they
will receive tomorrow (see equation (6)).
Next we use the free entry condition to establish a relationship between the interest
rate and the measure of entering ¯rms. Expected pro¯ts of a ¯rm entering at date t
are given by
E
£
¦t+1(s)
¤
= ½
³
E
h
Zt+1F(Ht+1(g);Gt+1)
¯
¯g
i
¡ wt+1
³
Ht+1(g) + E[Gt+1jg]
´´
+ (1 ¡ ½)
³
E
h
Zt+1F(Ht+1(b);Gt+1)
¯
¯b
i
¡ wt+1
³
Ht+1(b) + E[Gt+1jb]
´´
: (15)
Summing over all ¯rms and using market clearing conditions (4) and (5), we have
¹t+1E
£
¦t+1(s)
¤
= Yt+1 ¡ wt+1:
The free entry condition (3) can thus be written as
Yt+1=¹t+1 ¡ wt+1=¹t+1
1 + rt+1
= Á;
or, using (12) and (13),
1 + rt+1 =
A(1 ¡ µ)
Á
¹
¡µ
t+1: (16)
We can now use equation (16) together with the equation for output (13) in equa-
tion (14) to solve for the measure of ¯rms that will be producing in period t + 1:
¹t+1 = ¤A¹
1¡µ
t ¡ ¤c
3
t; (17)
18where
¤ =
¯
Á(1 + ¯)
·
1 +
µ
(1 ¡ µ)(1 + ¯ + ¯2)
¸¡1
: (18)
Finally, consumption of the old in period t+1 is given by the return on the period t
savings of the middle-aged, that is,
c
3
t+1 =
µ
¯
1 + ¯
¶
(1 + rt+1)
¡
Yt ¡ c
3
t
¢
; (19)
where rt+1 is given by (16).
While this algorithm is independent of the type of equilibrium, the constant A does
depend on the the type of equilibrium under study, which itself depends on parameter
values. We now partition the parameter space into three regions corresponding to each
type of equilibrium.
4.2 Types of Equilibria
Parameter values completely determine the type of equilibrium we obtain. Let
Eg = E[Zjs = g] = ¼gZH+(1¡¼g)ZL and Eb = E[Zjs = b] = ¼bZH+(1¡¼b)ZL denote
the expected productivity level of a ¯rm with a good and bad signal, respectively.
We show in the Appendix that when the ratio of relative productivities is such that
Eg < °ZH; (20)
then the equilibrium is one where all ¯rms with a high realized productivity level,
regardless of the signal they received, hire generalists. Similarly, when the relative
productivities is such that
Eb < °ZH · Eg; (21)
then the equilibrium is one where only ¯rms that received a bad signal but a high
realized productivity level hire generalists. Finally, if
°ZH · Eb; (22)
then all individuals will be specialists.
It should be noted that these conditions completely characterize the path of the
economy, in the sense that if we start in one of these cases, the economy will remain
19in that case.14 Table 1 summarizes the types of equilibria that can occur in this
economy.
Table 1: Types of Equilibria
Type Description Condition
Type 1:a All high productivity ¯rms hire generalists Eb < Eg < °ZH
Type 2:
Only high productivity ¯rms who received
bad signal hire generalists Eb < °ZH · Eg
Type 3: All individuals are specialists °ZH · Eb < Eg
aThe case where all individuals are generalists (ZL = 0) is a special case of Type 1.
4.3 Convergence
The transitional dynamics for any type of equilibrium are very tractable. The follow-
ing lemma establishes that we can take initial conditions to have the property that
promised consumption to the old is a constant fraction of income, which will be useful
in our next proposition.
Lemma 2 For any (c3
t;¹t), consumption promised to the old in period t + 1 is a
constant fraction of output in period t + 1, i.e. c3
t+1 = ®Yt+1.
Proof. First note that using equation (16), equation (14) implies that
Xt = Á¹t+1
·
1 +
µ
(1 ¡ µ)(1 + ¯ + ¯2)
¸
:
Using (16) and the ¯rst equality in (14), we can also rewrite equation (19) as
c
3
t+1 =
µ
A(1 ¡ µ)
Á
¶
¹
¡µ
t+1Xt
= A(1 ¡ µ)
·
1 +
µ
(1 ¡ µ)(1 + ¯ + ¯2)
¸
¹
1¡µ
t+1:
Finally, using (13), it follows that c3
t+1 = ®Yt+1, where 0 < ® < 1 is given by
® = 1 ¡ µ
·
¯ + ¯2
1 + ¯ + ¯2
¸
: (23)
14This will not necessarily be the case in section 5, where we introduce turbulence.
20Figure 1: Convergence
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Proposition 4 Given parameter values, every equilibrium path converges to a unique
steady state. The logarithmic distance of output from its steady state level is reduced
by fraction µ every period.
Proof. Following Lemma 2, we can take c3
t = ®Yt. Then equations (13) and (17)
imply that
¹t+1 = (1 ¡ ®)¤A¹
1¡µ
t : (24)
Figure 1 plots this last equation along with the 45± line. This Figure illustrates
that for any ¹0 > 0, the economy converges monotonically to a unique steady state
labeled ^ ¹.
The steady state measure of ¯rms and output (using equation (13)) are given by
^ ¹ = (A(1 ¡ ®)¤)
1
µ ; (25)
^ Y = A
1
µ ((1 ¡ ®)¤)
1¡µ
µ ; (26)
where ® (given by equation (23)), ¤ (given by equation (18)), and A (given by equa-
tions (33){(36) in Appendix A) are all functions of exogenous parameters. Finally,
equation (13) implies that
Yt+1
^ Y
=
µ
¹t+1
^ ¹
¶1¡µ
=
µ
Yt
^ Y
¶1¡µ
:
21It is interesting to note that neither ® nor ¤ depend on any of the uncertainty
parameters. It follows that the e®ect of uncertainty is fully captured by the con-
stant A. We exploit this fact below to show that steady state output increases as
signals become more informative.
4.4 Comparative Statics
We now establish two key results concerning the way in which output and human
capital react to changes in the precision of signals. Before doing so, notice that as the
precision of signals increases|Eb decreases and Eg increases|the Type of equilibrium
may change (See Table 1): if initially we have a Type 1 or Type 3 equilibrium, we
may end up in a Type 2 equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Assume that the fraction of ¯rms with high productivity (¼) and the
fraction of ¯rms with good signal (½) remain constant as the precision of signals (¼g
and ¼b) changes. Then steady state output is increasing in the precision of signals.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
This Proposition suggests that economies in which good ¯rms are likely to remain
good are more productive than economies where ¯rms face a lot of uncertainty about
their future productivity. Although the economic success of Japan after WWII is well
known, convincing evidence on the extent of uncertainty in the economy at any given
point in time is not readily available. However, there is considerable evidence that
Japan's human capital was notoriously speci¯c (e.g. see ?), which we now show is
consistent with our model in type 1 economies.
Proposition 6 Assume that the fraction of ¯rms with high productivity (¼) and the
fraction of ¯rms with good signal (½) remain constant as the precision of signals
(¼g and ¼b) changes. In Type 1 economies, where all high productivity ¯rms hire
generalists, the fraction of workers investing in speci¯c human capital is increasing
in the precision of signals.
22Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Together, our last two Propositions suggest that economies with lower uncertainty
tend to have more speci¯c human capital and be more productive than economies
with higher uncertainty. However, we will argue in the next section that what
makes economies more productive during times of low uncertainty also makes these
economies more vulnerable to turbulence.
It should be noted, however, that our last Proposition does not extend to other
types of equilibria. For instance, if an increase in the precision of signals moves the
economy from Type 3 (where there are no generalists) to Type 2 (where generalists
only work in surprisingly good ¯rms), then the fraction of individuals with speci¯c
human capital must decrease.
5 The Impact of Turbulence
In order to study the impact of turbulence, we introduce an aggregate state which
determines the accuracy of signals and takes one of two values: z 2 fP;Ng. The
environment described in Section 2 corresponds to the precise state P, while in the
noisy state N signals are completely uninformative: the probability of a ¯rm drawing
high productivity is independent of the signal it received. To keep the fraction of high
productivity ¯rms (¼) unchanged, we set the probability of getting high productivity
in the noisy state equal to ¼ regardless of the signal. Accordingly, one can think of
state N as a state of the world in which productivities are re-shu²ed across ¯rms
while maintaining the same ex post measure of ¯rms with low and high productivity
as in state P. In that sense, the aggregate technology set remains constant across
states.
It should be noted that only Type 1 or Type 3 equilibria can emerge in an economy
which expects to remain in state N. When signals are completely uninformative, we
have Eg = Eb = Z. The conditions summarized in Table 1 imply that either Z < °ZH
and a Type 1 equilibrium emerges, or Z > °ZH and we have a Type 3 equilibrium.
However, we view Type 1 equilibria as a more plausible and interesting case. This
is because type 3 equilibria can only occur if the productivity levels are close to
one another and general human capital is su±ciently less productive than speci¯c
23human capital, which means that heterogeneity across ¯rms plays a very minor role
in that case. Although we present some results for Type 3 equilibria below, we will
concentrate our analysis mainly on Type 1 equilibria.
In the rest of this section we study the e®ects of two forms of turbulence, where
turbulence is de¯ned in a natural way as a drop in the precision of signals. The
¯rst one is an expected permanent change in the precision of signals, realized before
any investment in human capital has been made. As such, this experiment consists
of a regime switch from tranquil to turbulent times. Our second experiment is an
unexpected transitory turbulence shock, that is, signals are uninformative for a single
period.
5.1 Expected Permanent Change in Precision of Signals
Consider an economy which is initially in steady state. In period 0, before any
investment decisions have been made, everyone learns that from now on signals no
longer contain any information. To determine the e®ects of this regime switch, we only
need to determine how the steady state to which the economy will converge compares
to the original steady state. Our convergence results from Section 4.3 imply that the
economy will converge smoothly to this new steady state.
Proposition 7 Following a permanent switch to a world in which signals are no
longer informative (state N), the economy converges to a new steady state with lower
output. The loss in output is increasing in the precision of signals in the original
steady state.
Proof. Recall that the transition to the new steady state is monotone (see Proposi-
tion 4). The proof then follows from Proposition 5, which establishes that the steady
state value of output is increasing in the precision of signals.
Figure 2 depicts the path of output following a regime switch from tranquil to
turbulent times. The path for the measure of ¯rms (¹t) mimics that of output. If the
initial steady state is of Type 1, this Proposition implies that a regime switch has a
larger impact in economies where speci¯c human capital is more predominant. The
adjustment to the ratio of speci¯c to general human capital for the young adjusts
24Figure 2: Expected regime switch (µ = 2=3)
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immediately and remains at that new, lower level throughout the transition. This
Proposition implies that the impact of turbulence depends in a crucial way on the
amount of fundamental uncertainty prior to the regime switch.
5.2 Unexpected Turbulence Shock
In the last section we established that an expected regime switch from tranquil to
turbulent times sends the economy on a smooth path towards a lower steady state.
We now demonstrate that a transient turbulence shock can cause a prolonged period
of low output. More importantly, we show that the fewer specialists a Type 1 economy
has in the period of the shock, the more resilient it is to transient turbulence shocks.
We ¯rst establish the intuitive result that output falls in the period of the shock,
whether the (unexpected) shock is transitory or permanent.
Proposition 8 An unexpected turbulence shock (transitory or permanent) leads to
an immediate decrease in output relative to tranquil times, even though the fraction
of ¯rms with high productivity remains constant.
Proof. First, consider an \informed" economy in which the number of entering ¯rms
¹T is the same as in our economy just before the shock, but the shock is foreseen.
Since investment in, and the allocation of, human capital in the \informed" economy
is e±cient, the output in that economy in the period of turbulence is greater than in
the economy that was surprised: Y I
T > Y N
T .
25Second, output in the arti¯cial \informed" economy is smaller than that of the
undisturbed economy: Y I
T < Y P
T . To see this, note that, given ¹T, output is pinned
down by the constant A (equation (13)). In the proof of Proposition 5 (see Appendix
B.1), we established that A is strictly increasing in the precision of signals. And since
the undisturbed economy has more precise signals than the \informed" one (due to
the nature of the turbulence shock), it will produce strictly greater output from the
same number of ¯rms. It follows that Y N
T < Y P
T .
Our next Proposition establishes, for Type 1 and Type 3 economies, that the size
of the fall is increasing in the precision of signals in tranquil times.
Proposition 9 Assume that the fraction of ¯rms with high productivity (¼) and the
fraction of ¯rms with good signal (½) remain constant as the precision of signals
(¼g and ¼b) changes. If the economy is initially in a Type 1 or Type 3 equilibrium,
then the fraction of output lost following an unexpected transitory turbulence shock is
increasing in the precision of signals in tranquil times.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Observe that this proposition states that the proportional decrease in output is
relative to where the economy would have been without turbulence, not relative to
where the economy was last period. In other words, the result holds whether the
economy is in or out of steady state prior to the shock.
This Proposition establishes that economies that are initially more productive
(see Proposition 5) are also more vulnerable to turbulence shocks. The force that
makes economies more productive (speci¯c human capital) is also at the heart of
their vulnerability to turbulence, as speci¯c human capital cannot be re-allocated
ex post. Note that while this result only involves the intensive margin for Type 3
equilibria, it involves both the intensive and extensive margins for Type 1 equilibria
since low uncertainty prior to the shock is conducive to the accumulation of speci¯c
human capital in such economies.
In order to determine the path of the economy following an unexpected turbulence
shock, we need to know how the (smaller than expected) output is distributed among
the generations in the period of the shock, because the amount of investment depends
on the income of middle-aged workers. One possible approach is to ful¯ll the promise
26to either the middle-aged or the old individuals (we cannot ful¯ll both as the expected
output is equal to the sum of these promises). The problem with this approach is
that the realized output may not be su±cient to ful¯ll either one of these promises.
The approach we follow is to consider how the output would be allocated if the
turbulence shock were not exactly unexpected { we introduce a positive probability
of the turbulent state into the original economy (maintaining complete markets) and
look at how the output is distributed in the turbulent state. It turns out that the
resources are allocated between the middle-aged and old individuals in the same
proportions in the two states (normal and turbulent).15
Let ± denote the probability of the aggregate state z = P and let qt(z) denote
the price in period t of an Arrow security that pays one unit of consumption good
in period t + 1 contingent on the aggregate state being z. Finally, let Y d
t = Yt ¡ c3
t
denote the disposable income of middle-aged workers in period t.
Proposition 10 The fractions of total output allocated to old and middle-aged work-
ers are the same in all states:
c3
t(P)
Y d
t (P)
=
c3
t(N)
Y d
t (N)
:
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
To summarize, Proposition 9 establishes the extent of the initial downturn in the
economy. Proposition 10 establishes how resources are distributed among individuals
of di®erent ages in the period of the shock, thereby determining the initial condi-
tions for the subsequent convergence which is described in Proposition 4. Figure 3
illustrates the path of output following a transitory turbulence shock.
Notice that in the period of the shock, human capital used in production is ¯xed
from the previous period. Furthermore, since the environment in the period of the
shock is the same as it was prior to the shock (other than the measure of ¯rms),
entering ¯rms will make the same decisions in terms of human capital investments as
15If the promise to the old individuals is ful¯lled, the magnitude of the shock is magni¯ed following
the shock, as the fall in the income of middle-aged people (and hence investment) is disproportion-
ately large. On the other hand, if the promise to the middle aged is ful¯lled, the economy completely
recovers in the period after the shock, as the investment does not su®er. The \intermediate" case
we consider is illustrated in Figure 3.
27Figure 3: Unexpected one-time shock (µ = 2=3)
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before. Therefore the fraction of individuals with speci¯c and general human capital
in the period of the shock and throughout the transition path remains the same as
it was prior to the shock. The lower output in the period of the shock is due to the
misallocation of labor across ¯rms in that period. The persistence of the shock is due
to the fact that lower output translates into a lower measure of ¯rms entering, and
so on.
Taken together, the results of this section imply that whereas economies charac-
terized by low volatility tend to have more speci¯c human capital and higher output,
they also tend to be more vulnerable to turbulence shocks, which cause prolonged
periods of low output. To the extent that the Japanese economy featured low un-
certainty prior to a sudden rise in economic volatility, the model is consistent with
Japan going through a prolonged stagnation after decades of prosperity. It should be
emphasized that conventional productivity measures would attribute the stagnation
period to low productivity, despite the fact that the aggregate technology in the model
remains unchanged throughout that period. In that sense, the low measured produc-
tivity in Japan since the 1990's documented by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) may be
due to a lack of reallocation of resources, consistent with the ¯ndings of Kawamoto
(2004).
286 Conclusion
This paper shows that the choice of speci¯c versus general human capital can lead
economies to prosper under tranquil times but also to experience prolong stagnation
when hit by turbulence shocks. In turn, the prevalence of speci¯c human capital is
largely determined by the extent of uncertainty in tranquil times. We argue that our
theory o®ers a coherent view of Japan's economic experience since WWII.
We also believe that our theory speaks to the experience of a variety of countries in
a catching up phase of development. For instance, many countries (including Japan,
but also many European countries) after WWII chose a relatively specialized labor
force. This choice was made at a time when these countries were relatively far from
the world technology leader, and so faced relatively little uncertainty about future
pro¯tability as they could use the U.S. as a laboratory. Of course, as our theory
implies, a high degree of commitment is needed in order to take advantage of this
period of low volatility. Our theory also implies that taking advantage of low volatility
periods may involve a lack of reallocation which propels the economy into a prolong
stagnation if hit by a turbulence shock.
The previous paragraph also points to an important caveat of this paper: what
di®erentiates countries in our model is the extent of uncertainty in the economy, for
which convincing evidence is hard to ¯nd. An obvious starting point could be to
investigate the persistence of pro¯ts over time in di®erent economies. Such measures,
however, are highly problematic. In particular, our model does not imply that pro¯ts
are more volatile in turbulent times relative to tranquil times.16 The reason is that
the composition of the labor force changes in such a way as to mitigate the impact of
uncertainty. As an extreme case, our model implies that economies in which the labor
force is predominately composed of generalists are largely immune to turbulence. We
view the fact that Japan's human capital is notoriously speci¯c as evidence that
uncertainty was low in Japan prior to the recent turbulent episode.
16Indeed, Odagiri and Yamawaki (1986) present mixed evidence on the persistent of pro¯ts in the
U.S. versus Japan.
29A Equilibria: Details
Since all types of equilibrium are very similar, we only present in detail how to
construct an equilibrium for one of these cases. For the other cases, we only present
the value of the constant A, which is su±cient to construct an equilibrium as shown
in Section 4.
A.1 Type 1: All High Productivity Firms Hire Generalists
A.1.1 Middle-Aged Firms' Problems
There are four (4) types of middle-aged ¯rms: ¯rms who received a good signal when
young can either have a high or low productivity level, and similarly for ¯rms who
received a bad signal.
Good Signal (s = g), High Productivity (Z = ZH) Firms who received a
good signal when young decided to hire and train H(g) individuals in speci¯c human
capital. Their problem when middle-aged is as follows:
R(ZH;H(g)) ´ max
G>0
n
ZH(H(g) + °G)
µ ¡ w
GG
o
;
where wG is the wage rate of generalists and G is the number of generalists to be
hired. Optimality implies that
w
G = µZH°(H(g) + °G)
µ¡1; (27)
and the number of generalists to hire is given by17
G(g) =
1
°
"µ
°µZH
wG
¶ 1
1¡µ
¡ H(g)
#
: (28)
The revenue function for these ¯rms is therefore given by
R(ZH;H(g)) = ZH
µ
°µZH
wG
¶ µ
1¡µ
¡
wG
°
"µ
°µZH
wG
¶ 1
1¡µ
¡ H(g)
#
= (1 ¡ µ)ZH
µ
°µZH
wG
¶ µ
1¡µ
+
wG
°
H(g):
17Since ¯rms with low productivity do not hire generalists, it should be clear that G(g) denotes
the number of generalists hired by ¯rms who received a good signal (and a high productivity level).
30Good Signal (s = g), Low Productivity (Z = ZL) Although these ¯rms have a
low realized productivity, they still received a good signal when young and thus also
decided to hire and train H(g) individuals. Since these ¯rms will de¯nitely not hire
generalists (they would want to get rid of some of their specialists, so G = 0 for these
¯rms), their revenue function when middle-aged is given by
R(ZL;H(g)) ´ ZLH(g)
µ:
Bad Signal (s = b), High Productivity (Z = ZH) Firms who received a bad
signal when young decided to hire and train H(b) individuals in speci¯c human capital.
Their problem when middle-aged is as follows:
R(ZH;H(b)) ´ max
G>0
n
ZH(H(b) + °G)
µ ¡ w
GG
o
:
Optimality implies that
w
G = µZH°(H(b) + °G)
µ¡1; (29)
and the number of generalists to hire in this case is given by18
G(b) =
1
°
"µ
°µZH
wG
¶ 1
1¡µ
¡ H(b)
#
; (30)
so their revenue function is given by
R(ZH;H(b)) = (1 ¡ µ)ZH
µ
°µZH
wG
¶ µ
1¡µ
+
wG
°
H(b):
Bad Signal (s = b), Low Productivity (Z = ZL) These ¯rms realized a low
productivity after getting a bad signal, so they hired H(b) specialists and will not
hire any generalists (G = 0), so their revenue function when middle-aged is given by
R(ZL;H(b)) ´ ZLH(b)
µ:
From equations (27) and (29), we get the following relationship between high
productivity ¯rms' hiring decisions:
H(g) ¡ H(b) = °[G(b) ¡ G(g)]:
18Since ¯rms with low productivity do not hire generalists, it should be clear that G(b) denotes
the number of generalists hired by ¯rms who received a bad signal (and a high productivity level).
31A.1.2 Young Firms' Problems
There are two types of young ¯rms: those with a good signal and those with a bad
signal. Both types of ¯rms need to make a hiring decision when young based on their
expected pro¯ts when middle-aged.
Good signal (s = g) The problem for ¯rms who receive a good signal is as follows:
max
H
n
¼gR(ZH;H) + (1 ¡ ¼g)R(ZL;H) ¡ w
HH
o
;
where wH is the wage rate per unit of ¯rm speci¯c human capital. Optimality thus
requires that
w
H = ¼g
wG
°
+ (1 ¡ ¼g)µZLH
µ¡1;
which means that
H(g) =
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼g)µZL
°wH ¡ ¼gwG
¶ 1
1¡µ
: (31)
Bad signal (s = b) The problem for ¯rms who receive a bad signal when young is
as follows:
max
H
n
¼bR(ZH;H) + (1 ¡ ¼b)R(ZL;H) ¡ w
HH
o
:
Optimality thus requires that
w
H = ¼b
wG
°
+ (1 ¡ ¼b)µZLH
µ¡1;
which means that
H(b) =
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼b)µZL
°wH ¡ ¼bwG
¶ 1
1¡µ
: (32)
Notice that by replacing the expression for H(g) (equation (31)) into the expres-
sion for G(g) (equation (28)), we have
G(g) =
(°µ)
1
1¡µ
°
"µ
ZH
wG
¶ 1
1¡µ
¡
µ
(1 ¡ ¼g)ZL
°wH ¡ ¼gwG
¶ 1
1¡µ
#
;
which is strictly positive if ° > ¼g and the following condition holds:19
ZH
ZL
>
1 ¡ ¼g
° ¡ ¼g
;
19This condition corresponds to equation (20) in the main text.
32that is, this type of equilibrium occurs if (i) high productivity ¯rms are su±ciently
more productive than low productivity ¯rms, (ii) the probability of getting high pro-
ductivity conditional on having received a good signal is not too high, and (iii) if
the productivity of general human capital (relative to speci¯c human capital) is suf-
¯ciently high. Another way to write the previous expression is as follows:
°ZH > E[Zjs = g] = Eg;
which simply says that the good productivity level is su±ciently high and su±ciently
productive relative to expected productivity once a ¯rm knows her signal.
Similarly, by replacing the expression for H(b) (equation (32)) into the expression
for G(b) (equation (30)), we can see that G(b) will be strictly positive if ° > ¼b and
the following condition holds:20
ZH
ZL
>
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
;
which means that when this condition is not satis¯ed, there will be no generalists in
equilibrium.
A.1.3 Labor Market Clearing Condition
The global labor market clearing condition is that the total number of workers hired
adds up to unity. Since a fraction ½ of ¯rms, of which there are a total of ¹, receive
a good signal and hire H(g) individuals, and similarly for ¯rms who receive a bad
signal, the labor market clearing condition for specialists (equation (5)) states that
1 ¡ M = ¹½H(g) + ¹(1 ¡ ½)H(b):
Similarly, middle-aged ¯rms with good signals who's productivity turns out to be
high (½¼g) hire G(g) generalists, and similarly for ¯rms with bad signals, so that the
labor market clearing condition for generalists (equation (4)) simpli¯es to
M = ¹½¼gG(g) + ¹(1 ¡ ½)¼bG(b):
20This condition corresponds to equation (21) in the main text.
33Adding up these two labor market clearing conditions, we have
¹½
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼g)µZL
°wH ¡ ¼gwG
¶ 1
1¡µ
+ ¹(1 ¡ ½)
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼b)µZL
°wH ¡ ¼bwG
¶ 1
1¡µ
+ ¹½¼g
1
°
"µ
°µZH
wG
¶ 1
1¡µ
¡
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼g)µZL
°wH ¡ ¼gwG
¶ 1
1¡µ
#
+ ¹(1 ¡ ½)¼b
1
°
"µ
°µZH
wG
¶ 1
1¡µ
¡
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼b)µZL
°wH ¡ ¼bwG
¶ 1
1¡µ
#
= 1;
which, since wH = wG = wt, simpli¯es to
¹
µ
µ
wt
¶ 1
1¡µ
(
½
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼g)ZL
° ¡ ¼g
¶ 1
1¡µ
+ (1 ¡ ½)
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼b)ZL
° ¡ ¼b
¶ 1
1¡µ
+ ½¼g
1
°
"
(°ZH)
1
1¡µ ¡
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼g)ZL
° ¡ ¼g
¶ 1
1¡µ
#
+(1 ¡ ½)¼b
1
°
"
(°ZH)
1
1¡µ ¡
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼b)ZL
° ¡ ¼b
¶ 1
1¡µ
#)
= 1;
and we get
wt = µA¹
1¡µ
t ;
where A is de¯ned by
A =
(
½
"
¼gZH (°ZH)
µ
1¡µ + (1 ¡ ¼g)ZL
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼g)ZL
° ¡ ¼g
¶ µ
1¡µ
#
+ (1 ¡ ½)
"
¼bZH (°ZH)
µ
1¡µ + (1 ¡ ¼b)ZL
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼b)ZL
° ¡ ¼b
¶ µ
1¡µ
#)1¡µ
: (33)
A.2 Type 2: Only High Productivity Firms with Bad Signals
Hire Generalists
The only di®erence with the previous section is that G(g) = 0. It follows that the
constant A implied by the labor market clearing condition is now de¯ned as
A =
(
½E
1
1¡µ
g + (1 ¡ ½)
"
¼bZH (°ZH)
µ
1¡µ + (1 ¡ ¼b)ZL
µ
°(1 ¡ ¼b)ZL
° ¡ ¼b
¶ µ
1¡µ
#)1¡µ
:
(34)
34A.3 Type 3: All Individuals are Specialists
The only di®erence with Type 1 economies is that G(g) = G(b) = 0. It follows that
the constant A implied by the labor market clearing condition is now de¯ned as
A =
µ
½E
1
1¡µ
g + (1 ¡ ½)E
1
1¡µ
b
¶1¡µ
: (35)
A.4 Special Case of Type 1: All Individuals are Generalists
Finally, in this special case, we have
A =
³
¼
¡
°
µZH
¢ 1
1¡µ + (1 ¡ ¼)
¡
°
µZL
¢ 1
1¡µ
´1¡µ
: (36)
Note that this expression simpli¯es further as ZL = 0 is a necessary condition for this
type of equilibrium to occur.
B Proofs
The exercise in the following propositions is to increase ¼g and decrease ¼b, keeping ½
constant, so that the fraction of ¯rms with high productivity, ¼ = ½¼g + (1 ¡ ½)¼b, is
unchanged. That is, ¼b =
¼¡½¼g
1¡½ . The nature of the exercise allows us to employ the
following result:
Lemma 3 If f is strictly convex and ¼b =
¼¡½¼g
1¡½ , then the function ½f(¼g) + (1 ¡
½)f(¼b) is increasing in ¼g whenever ¼g > ¼b.
Proof. The proof follows by simply replacing the formula for ¼b into the function
and taking the derivative.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 5
We need to show that the value of A is strictly increasing in the precision of the
signals (see equation (26)). It will be convenient to de¯ne D = A
1
1¡µ and show that
D is strictly increasing in the precision of the signals. We have three cases to consider,
depending on the type of equilibrium under consideration.
35Type 1: All ¯rms with high productivity hire extra general human capital.21 This
is the case when Eg < °ZH. Note that this implies ° > ¼g > ¼b. The formula for
D come from equation (33). Di®erentiating with respect to ¼g and recalling that
d¼b
d¼g = ¡
½
1¡½, we get
dD
d¼g
=
½°
µ
1¡µZ
1
1¡µ
L
(1 ¡ µ)
"µ
1 ¡ ¼g
° ¡ ¼g
¶ µ
1¡µ µ
µ
1 ¡ ¼g
° ¡ ¼g
¡ 1
¶
¡
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¶ µ
1¡µ µ
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¡ 1
¶#
:
De¯ne the functions g(p) =
1¡p
°¡p and f(p) = g(p)
µ
1¡µ(µg(p) ¡ 1) and note that dD
d¼g =
½°
µ
1¡µ Z
1
1¡µ
L
(1¡µ) (f(¼g) ¡ f(¼b)). To show that the value of D is strictly increasing in the
precision of signals, we need to show that f(¼g) ¡ f(¼b) > 0. This follows from the
facts that ¼g > ¼b and that f is strictly increasing on [¼b;¼g]. To establish the latter,
recall that ° > ¼g, which implies that f is di®erentiable on the relevant interval.
f
0(p) =
µ
1 ¡ µ
g(p)
µ
1¡µ (1 ¡ °)2
(1 ¡ p)(° ¡ p)2 > 0:
Type 2: Only ¯rms with bad signals but high productivity hire extra general human
capital. This is the case when Eb < °ZH 6 Eg. Note that this implies
ZH
ZL >
1¡¼b
°¡¼b.
The formula for D in this case comes from equation (34). Taking the derivative with
respect to ¼g and recalling that
dEg
d¼g = ZH ¡ ZL, we get
dD
d¼g
= ½E
µ
1¡µ
g
ZH ¡ ZL
1 ¡ µ
¡ ½°
µ
1¡µZ
1
1¡µ
H ¡
½°
µ
1¡µZ
1
1¡µ
L
1 ¡ µ
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¶ µ
1¡µ µ
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¡ 1
¶
:
Since Eg > °ZH,
dD
d¼g
>
½°
µ
1¡µZ
1
1¡µ
L
1 ¡ µ
"µ
ZH
ZL
¶ µ
1¡µ µ
µ
ZH
ZL
¡ 1
¶
¡
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¶ µ
1¡µ µ
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¡ 1
¶#
:
De¯ne the function h(x) = x
µ
1¡µ(µx ¡ 1) and note that
dD
d¼g =
½°
µ
1¡µ Z
1
1¡µ
L
1¡µ
³
h
³
ZH
ZL
´
¡ h
³
1¡¼b
°¡¼b
´´
. So, to show that the value of D is strictly
21The special case in which everyone invests in general human capital only is trivial: a decrease
in the precision of the signal has no e®ect.
36increasing in the precision of the signals, we need to show that h
³
ZH
ZL
´
¡h
³
1¡¼b
°¡¼b
´
> 0.
This follows from the facts that
ZH
ZL >
1¡¼b
°¡¼b and that h is strictly increasing on [1;+1):
h
0(x) =
µg(x)
µ
1¡µ
(1 ¡ µ)x
(x ¡ 1):
Type 3: Everyone invests in speci¯c human capital only. The formula for D then
comes from equation (35).
dD
d¼g
=
½(ZH ¡ ZL)
1 ¡ µ
µ
E
µ
1¡µ
g ¡ E
µ
1¡µ
b
¶
> 0:
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We will show that the ratio of the stocks of speci¯c and general human capital H
G =
½H(g)+(1¡½)H(b)
½¼gG(g)+(1¡½)¼bG(b) is increasing in the precision of signals. Please refer to Appendix
A.1 for derivations of underlying formulae.
When all high productivity ¯rms hire generalists, equations (31) and (32) apply,
and the total stock of speci¯c human capital is given by
H =
µ
°µZL
w
¶ 1
1¡µ
Ã
½
µ
1 ¡ ¼g
° ¡ ¼g
¶ 1
1¡µ
+ (1 ¡ ½)
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¶ 1
1¡µ
!
Using equations (28) and (30), we get the total stock of general human capital:
G =
1
°
"
¼
µ
°µZH
w
¶ 1
1¡µ
¡
µ
°µZL
w
¶ 1
1¡µ
Ã
½¼g
µ
1 ¡ ¼g
° ¡ ¼g
¶ 1
1¡µ
+ (1 ¡ ½)¼b
µ
1 ¡ ¼b
° ¡ ¼b
¶ 1
1¡µ
!#
Taking the ratio,
H
G
=
°Z
1
1¡µ
L
µ
½
³
1¡¼g
°¡¼g
´ 1
1¡µ
+ (1 ¡ ½)
³
1¡¼b
°¡¼b
´ 1
1¡µ
¶
µZ
1
1¡µ
H ¡ Z
1
1¡µ
L
µ
½¼g
³
1¡¼g
°¡¼g
´ 1
1¡µ
+ (1 ¡ ½)¼b
³
1¡¼b
°¡¼b
´ 1
1¡µ
¶
De¯ne the following functions: f(x) =
³
1¡x
°¡x
´ 1
1¡µ
and g(x) = xf(x). Both functions
are strictly convex on (¡1;°). Applying Lemma 3, we conclude that the numerator
of the ratio is increasing and the denominator of the ratio is decreasing in ¼g. Thus,
the ratio of specialists to generalists is increasing in the precision of signals when all
high productivity ¯rms hire generalists (Type 1).
37B.3 Proof of Proposition 9
B.3.1 Initial equilibrium is Type 1
Consider two economies, A and B, both of Type 1, with the same fraction of ¯rms
receiving signal g and the same fraction of ¯rms receiving productivity ZH. Assume
that signals are more precise in economy A, that is, ¼A
g > ¼B
g and ¼A
b < ¼B
b . We need
to show that the proportional drop in output following an unexpected turbulence
shock is greater in economy A than in economy B. We know from Proposition 5 that
output in tranquil times is higher in economy A. We will show that output following
an unexpected turbulence shock is lower in economy A, which implies that the fall is
greater in economy A.
Consider additionally the \informed" economy I (see the proof of Proposition
8), where agents knew that signals were uninformative ahead of time (and allocated
investment and labor accordingly). Note that economy I is also of type 1, and we
can apply equations (31) and (32) to show
HA
g
HA
b
>
HB
g
HB
b
>
HI
g
HI
b
= 1, where HE
s is the
total amount of speci¯c human capital in ¯rms with signals s in economy E. Further,
Proposition 6 implies that HA > HB > HI and GA < GB < GI, where H and G are
the total stocks of speci¯c and general human capital respectively. By construction,
the allocation of investment and labor is optimal in economy I. This implies that
both misallocation of investment (speci¯c vs general) and misallocation of labor (Hg
vs Hb) are greater in economy A than in economy B.
We now simply need to show that (1) given any allocation of investment, output is
decreasing in misallocation of labor (Step 1 below); and (2) given any (proportional)
allocation of labor, output is decreasing in misallocation of investment (Step 2 below).
Step 1: Given G and H, output following the unexpected turbulence shock is de-
creasing in the misallocation of labor
Hg
Hb. The exercise is to increase Hg while keeping
H constant (this implies Hb =
H¡¹½Hg
¹(1¡½) ). Since the number of high productivity ¯rms
with bad signals is higher than expected, we have to consider Type 1 as well as Type 2
economies.
38Type 1: Output per ¯rm following the shock is
Y N
¹
= ¼½ZH(Hg + °G
N
g )
µ + ¼(1 ¡ ½)ZH(Hb + °G
N
b )
µ
+ (1 ¡ ¼)½ZLH
µ
g + (1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ ½)ZLH
µ
b (37)
Note that in this case all high productivity ¯rms employ the same amount of human
capital L = Hg +°GN
g = Hb +°GN
b . Further, since ¼¹L = ¼H+°G and both H and
G are ¯xed, the value of L is independent from the extent of misallocation of labor.
Hence, we only need to consider the last two terms in (37), and Lemma 3 guarantees
that output following the unexpected turbulence shock is decreasing in misallocation
of labor.
Type 2: Output per ¯rm following the shock is
Y N
¹
= ¼½ZHH
µ
g +¼(1¡½)ZH(Hb+°G
N
b )
µ+(1¡¼)½ZLH
µ
g +(1¡¼)(1¡½)ZLH
µ
b (38)
Simply taking derivative with respect to Hg (recalling that
dHb
dHg =
¡½
1¡½) con¯rms that
output is decreasing in misallocation of labor.
Step 2: Keeping
Hg
Hb constant, output following the unexpected turbulence shock
is decreasing in misallocation of investment. We will establish that output per ¯rm
following the shock is concave in G (keeping G + H constant). Since economy B has
too few generalists, and economy A has even fewer, this implies that economy A will
produce less output than economy B following the shock (even if it had the same
Hg
Hb
as economy B).
Again, we need to consider both Type 1 and Type 2 economies. Di®erentiating
equations (37) and (38) twice with respect to G establishes the desired concavity in
both cases.
B.3.2 Initial equilibrium is Type 3
The amount of output produced in the `precise' state is
Y
P = A¹
1¡µ;
39where A =
µ
½E
1
1¡µ
g + (1 ¡ ½)E
1
1¡µ
b
¶1¡µ
. If, unexpectedly, signals become completely
uninformative ex post, then total output produced is
Y
N =
¹1¡µ
A
µ
1¡µ
(¼ZH + (1 ¡ ¼)ZL)
µ
½E
µ
1¡µ
g + (1 ¡ ½)E
µ
1¡µ
b
¶
:
The proportional decrease in output in the period of an unexpected \noise shock" is
Y P ¡ Y N
Y N = ½(1 ¡ ½)
(ZH ¡ ZL)(¼g ¡ ¼b)
¼ZH + (1 ¡ ¼)ZL
¢
E
µ
1¡µ
g ¡ E
µ
1¡µ
b
½E
µ
1¡µ
g + (1 ¡ ½)E
µ
1¡µ
b
: (39)
Di®erentiating equation (39) with respect to ¼g shows that both fractions are in-
creasing in ¼g. Accordingly, the extent of damage (decrease in output) is greater in
economies with higher expected precision of signals. Intuitively, a higher expected
precision of signals increases output in the precise state (Y P) and decreases output in
the non-precise state (Y N), thus making the extent of damage greater in economies
with higher expected precision. Note that this result implies that Y P¡Y N
Y P is also
increasing in the precision of signals.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 10
Utility maximization by middle-aged workers implies the following state-contingent
savings:
qt¡1(P)c
3
t(P) =
±¯
1 + ¯
Y
d
t¡1;
qt¡1(N)c
3
t(N) =
(1 ¡ ±)¯
1 + ¯
Y
d
t¡1;
so that
c3
t(P)
c3
t(N)
=
±
1 ¡ ±
qt¡1(N)
qt¡1(P)
: (40)
Similarly, utility maximization of young workers in period t ¡ 1 implies that
qt¡1(P)Y
d
t (P) =
(¯ + ¯2)±
1 + ¯ + ¯2Wt¡1;
qt¡1(N)Y
d
t (N) =
(¯ + ¯2)(1 ¡ ±)
1 + ¯ + ¯2 Wt¡1;
40where Wt denotes the present value of lifetime income of young individuals born in
period t. It follows that
Y d
t (P)
Y d
t (N)
=
±
1 ¡ ±
qt¡1(N)
qt¡1(P)
: (41)
The statement of the Proposition follows from equations (40) and (41).
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